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INTOLERABLE ASYMMETRY AND UNCERTAINTY:
CONGRESS SHOULD RIGHT THE WRONGS OF THE
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991
WILLIAM R. CORBETT*
I. Introduction
The Supreme Court decided two cases during the 2019-20 term resolving
the standards of causation required to prove violations of two antidiscrimination statutes.1 Those decisions, Comcast Corp. v. National Ass’n
of African American-Owned Media2 and Babb v. Wilkie,3 exacerbate the
state of asymmetry in employment discrimination law regarding standards
of causation required to prove violations of the federal employment
discrimination laws. Furthermore, Comcast affects employment
discrimination law in a second deleterious way by perpetuating, and
perhaps escalating, the uncertainty regarding the proof frameworks
applicable to intentional discrimination claims under the various statutes.
Babb, on the other hand, increases the asymmetry regarding causation but
not the uncertainty regarding the applicable proof frameworks. Babb also
offers a modicum of hope for a better way forward by providing an
interpretation of statutory language regarding standards of causation that
may offer Congress an option for ameliorating the current situation.
The Supreme Court also decided another case in which the majority
opinion and a dissenting opinion discussed the standards of causation
applicable to Title VII—Bostock v. Clayton County.4 In that historic
decision, the Court held that Title VII covers sexual orientation and
transgender status.5 Embedded within the majority and dissenting opinions
* Frank L. Maraist, Wex S. Malone, and Rosemary Neal Hawkland Professor of Law,
Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State University. I am grateful to Professors Rebecca
White, Sandra Sperino, and Charles Sullivan for reading and commenting on a draft of this
Article.
1. Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Afr. Am.-Owned Media, 140 S. Ct. 1009, 1019
(2020); Babb v. Wilkie, 140 S. Ct. 1168, 1171 (2020). The Court also denied certiorari in a
case raising the issue of the appropriate standard of causation under the Americans with
Disabilities Act. Murray v. Mayo Clinic, 934 F.3d 1101, 1107 (9th Cir. 2019), cert. denied,
140 S. Ct. 2720 (2020).
2. 140 S. Ct. 1009 (2020).
3. 140 S. Ct. 1168 (2020).
4. 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
5. Id. at 1754.
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are discussions of standards of causation. Because the Court was not
choosing between standards of causation or proof frameworks in that case,
Bostock did not worsen the problem of asymmetry. Further, it did not
substantially increase uncertainty about which causation standard and
which proof framework apply under particular statutes. However, the
Justices’ discussion of causation does demonstrate how fundamental the
Court believes causation is to resolving issues under discrimination statutes.
Employment discrimination law has been plagued by two persistent
problems: asymmetry regarding the applicable causation standard and the
closely related issue of uncertainty regarding applicable proof frameworks.
Both of these problems stem from Congress’s amendment of some
employment discrimination statutes by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 6 and
the Supreme Court’s subsequent interpretations of what Congress did and
what it intended by those amendments.7
Speaking of Congress, the House passed a bill8 and the Senate had a
companion bill pending9 in the 116th Congress in 2019-20, the Protecting
Older Workers Against Discrimination Act (“POWADA”), 10 that attempts
to rectify the lack of uniformity in causation standards. The bill has a good
heart, but the solution that it proposes is inadequate to repair these salient
problems.
The first problem with the POWADA is that, while the latest version of
the Act would adopt a uniform standard of causation across the
employment discrimination statutes, it is unlikely that the “motivating
factor” standard selected by the POWADA would achieve the result
intended by proponents of the bill. “Motivating factor”11 has been a
6. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
42 U.S.C.).
7. See infra Sections II.B & II.C.
8. Protecting Older Workers Against Discrimination Act, H.R. 1230, 116th Cong.
(2020).
9. Protecting Older Workers Against Discrimination Act, S. 485, 116th Cong. (2019).
10. This Article discusses the versions of the POWADA introduced in the current
Congress and in the 2009-10 Congress where it was first introduced. Versions have also
been introduced in intervening sessions. See Laurie A. McCann, The Age Discrimination in
Employment Act at 50: When Will It Become a “Real” Civil Rights Statute?, 33 A.B.A. J.
LAB. & EMP. L. 89, 92–93 (2018).
11. “Motivating factor” is seldom defined. What we know is that it is a standard of
causation that is less demanding (lower) than but-for causation. The Court has described the
statutory “motivating factor” standard as a “relaxe[d]” standard compared with but-for
causation. E.E.O.C. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2032 (2015); see
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standard in Title VII since the 1991 amendments, 12 but the addition of this
standard has been accurately described by Professor Charles Sullivan as a
“noble failure.”13 Moreover, adding a “motivating factor” standard to all of
the employment discrimination statutes, while preserving the causation
standards already in them, would create uncertainty about the interaction of
the two causation standards within a statute, as it has done with Title VII. 14
The Babb decision provides an opportunity for further consideration of the
best uniform causation standard.
The second problem with the POWADA is that it does not resolve the
uncertainty regarding which proof framework is applicable to any given
individual disparate treatment claim, an issue that is interwoven with the

also infra note 14. The term was first used in the context of employment discrimination by
the plurality in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). The plurality borrowed
both that term and the mixed-motives analysis of which it was a part from a case analyzing
First Amendment protection—Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle,
429 U.S. 274 (1977). In the Price Waterhouse plurality opinion, Justice Brennan wrote as
follows: “[W]e mean that, if we asked the employer at the moment of the decision what its
reasons were and if we received a truthful response, one of those reasons would be that the
applicant or employee was a woman.” Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250. One of the
disagreements between the plurality and the O’Connor concurrence in Price Waterhouse
was about the appropriate standard of causation for the mixed-motives analysis. The
plurality used “motivating factor,” id. at 249–50, but Justice O’Connor argued that a more
demanding standard of causation was required in order to shift the burden of persuasion, and
she selected “substantial factor,” id. at 265 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Interestingly, the
Court in Mt. Healthy did not seem to distinguish between “motivating factor” and
“substantial factor,” but rather used them interchangeably. 429 U.S. at 576. Congress
selected “motivating factor” when, in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, it inserted the mixedmotives analysis in Title VII.
12. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107(a), 105 Stat. 1071, 1075
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
13. Charles A. Sullivan, Making Too Much of Too Little?: Why “Motivating Factor”
Liability Did Not Revolutionize Title VII, 62 ARIZ. L. REV. 357, 400 (2020) [hereinafter
Sullivan, Making Too Much].
14. Regarding Title VII, the Supreme Court has said that the addition of the “motivating
factor” standard in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 relaxed or lessened the but-for standard
embodied in the “because of” language in the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See EEOC v.
Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2032 (2015); Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med.
Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 348–49 (2013). It is unclear, however, how the two standards
in Title VII apply and interact in any given case. See, e.g., White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.,
533 F.3d 381, 396–97 (6th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1235 (2009).
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standard of causation. 15 This uncertainty has existed since the Court’s
interpretation of the 1991 Act in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa.16
The most recent POWADA bills also have a provision17 that hints,
unintentionally, 18 at another option that very well may be the best revision
of the law—dispensing with causation standards19 and proof frameworks.
Instead, courts would evaluate employment discrimination cases under the
standards used in civil litigation for determining whether the evidence
satisfies the burdens of production and persuasion.
The POWADA was destined not to become law in 2020. Even if the
Senate had passed the POWADA, the White House had suggested that the
President would veto the Act because of possible unforeseen
consequences—whatever that means.20 The bill has not been reintroduced
in Congress as yet in 2021.
Although the Comcast and Babb decisions have somewhat worsened the
state of employment discrimination law, they and the POWADA offer some
hope for an improvement—for a righting of the wrongs done both by and to

15. See infra Section II.A.
16. 539 U.S. 90 (2003). See infra Section II.B.
17.
. . . In establishing an unlawful practice under this Act, including under
paragraph (1) or by any other method of proof, a complaining party—
“(A) may rely on any type or form of admissible evidence and need only
produce evidence sufficient for a reasonable trier of fact to find that an
unlawful practice occurred under this Act . . . .”
Protecting Older Workers Against Discrimination Act, H.R. 1230, 116th Cong. § 2(a)(1)
(2020); Protecting Older Workers Against Discrimination Act, S. 485, 116th Cong. § 3(a)(1)
(2019).
18. The POWADA bills are intended to adopt a uniform “motivating factor” standard
across statutes. See H.R. 1230; S. 485 § 2(b)(1).
19. Although Title VII and other discrimination statutes require that discrimination be
“because of” of a particular protected characteristic, that phrase does not necessarily mean
but-for causation. But the Court has held that it does. See infra Section II.C. for a discussion
concerning Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009), and University of
Texas Southwest Medical Center v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (2013). See also infra Section II.C
for a discussion about the problems with focusing on causation standards in employment
discrimination law.
20. See Jaclyn Diaz, Age-Bias Bill Passed by House as White House Threatens Veto,
BLOOMBERG L. (Jan. 15, 2020, 6:14 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-laborreport/age-bias-bill-passed-by-house-as-white-house-threatens-veto.
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the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Congress should substantially amend and
enact the POWADA21 to address the asymmetry and uncertainty in the law.
Part II of this Article examines the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and the
Supreme Court’s interpretations of the Act in Desert Palace, Gross v. FBL
Financial Services,
Inc.,22 and University of Texas Southwestern Medical
23
Center v. Nassar, which initiated the asymmetry and uncertainty. Part III
considers the version of the POWADA introduced in Congress a decade
ago in the aftermath of Gross and the version in the 2019-20 congressional
session. Part IV considers the Supreme Court’s decisions in Comcast and
Babb and their ramifications for the asymmetry of causation standards and
uncertainty regarding proof structures. This Part also considers briefly the
discussion of causation in the Bostock opinions. Part V discusses
amendments to the POWADA that would present Congress with a law that
repairs much of the asymmetry and uncertainty in employment
discrimination law. In conclusion, this Article urges enactment of such a
law.
II. Desert Palace, Gross, and Nassar: The Wrongs Done by and to the Civil
Rights Act of 1991
The state of employment discrimination law is a mess. The focus on
standards of causation, the lack of uniformity among the statutes, and the
uncertainty regarding which proof framework applies to particular claims
render this area of law unnecessarily difficult to understand. 24 There are
many negative ramifications that make this a problem worth addressing.
21. Despite suggesting more extensive amendments, I do not suggest that the name of
the bill be changed. The POWADA was so named because it is intended to overturn
legislatively the Supreme Court’s decision in Gross, 557 U.S. 167, requiring plaintiffs
asserting claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act to prove but-for
causation. However, it does more than that, amending most employment discrimination
statutes to include a “motivating factor” causation standard. Although I propose more
extensive amendments, my suggestions relate to causation standards, their associated proof
frameworks, and achieving uniformity and certainty regarding those issues. Beyond the
substance of the amendments, there is substantial appeal and political cover in the idea of
giving older workers the same protections enjoyed by those covered by Title VII. See infra
Section V.A.
22. 557 U.S. 167 (2009).
23. 570 U.S. 338 (2013).
24. Carter G. Phillips, an experienced attorney who regularly argues cases before the
Supreme Court, expressed this idea: “I will say in 25 years of advocacy before this Court I
have not seen one area of the law that seems to me as difficult to sort out as this particular
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One certain ramification is the practical difficulty that attorneys and
courts encounter muddling through these cases every day. 25 A second
potential ramification is a risk that discrimination law—which is so
incomprehensible and which itself discriminates among the levels of
protection afforded to different groups—will be perceived by citizens as
unfair. For example, Title VII employs a relaxed standard of causation and
provides two proof frameworks to plaintiffs suing for color, race, sex,
religion, or national origin discrimination. 26 The Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, on the other hand, requires plaintiffs alleging age
discrimination to prove the more stringent standard of but-for causation
without the benefit of the mixed-motives framework. 27 When the law is not
symmetrical, citizens may not understand why anti-discrimination law
discriminates. Borrowing from George Orwell, people may wonder why all
people covered by employment discrimination laws are equal, “but some
are more equal than others.”28 Employment discrimination law is a complex
body of law, but it has been made unnecessarily inscrutable. A third
consequence is that courts and attorneys obfuscate, as they seemingly must

one is.” Transcript of Oral Argument at 29, Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167
(2009) (No. 08-441), https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/
2008/08-441.pdf.
25. See, e.g., Jones v. Okla. City Pub. Schs., 617 F.3d 1273, 1278–79 (10th Cir. 2010)
(discussing uncertainty about whether pretext analysis applies to ADEA cases); Weed v.
Sidewinder Drilling, Inc., 245 F. Supp. 3d 826, 837 (S.D. Tex. 2017) (recognizing
uncertainty about whether mixed-motive claims are viable under the ADA).
26. See supra note 14.
27. Gross, 557 U.S. at 175–76.
28. GEORGE ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM 112 (Harcourt, Brace & Co. 1946) (1945)
(containing the memorable and oft-quoted line: “All animals are equal, but some are more
equal than others”). Consider, for example, the Sixth Circuit’s holding, subsequently
reversed by the Supreme Court, that younger people are protected from age discrimination in
favor of older people:
[W]e do not share the commonly held belief that this situation is one of socalled “reverse discrimination.” Insofar as we are able to determine, the
expression “reverse discrimination” has no ascertainable meaning in the law.
An action is either discriminatory or it is not discriminatory, and some
discriminatory actions are prohibited by the law. . . . [T]he protected class
should be protected; to hold otherwise is discrimination, plain and simple.
Cline v. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc., 296 F.3d 466, 471 (6th Cir. 2003), rev’d, 540 U.S.
581 (2004). Reverse discrimination is an area in which courts sometimes rail against
asymmetry. See, e.g., Lind v. City of Battle Creek, 681 N.W.2d 334, 335 (Mich. 2004)
(rejecting distinctions in the analysis of reverse race discrimination claims).
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under the law, the real issues of discrimination law with discussions of
proof frameworks and standards of causation. 29
Congress has enacted three principal employment discrimination laws:
Title VII enacted in 1964,30 the Age Discrimination and Employment Act
(“ADEA”) enacted in 1967,31 and the Americans with Disabilities Act
(“ADA”) enacted in 1990. 32 Over five and a half decades, Congress has
amended these laws several times in an effort to keep pace with the
doctrinal developments in the Supreme Court. Among the amendments are
the following: the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978,33 amending Title
VII; the amendment to add the definition of religion to Title VII, including
non-accommodation, in 1972;34 the Civil Rights Act of 1991;35 the ADA
Amendments Act of 2008;36 and the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009. 37
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 was the most ambitious and overarching of
these amendments. 38 It overturned a number of Supreme Court decisions 39

29. Consider, for example, the Eleventh Circuit’s explanation that the pretext
framework did not focus the analysis on the real issue in a case involving comparative
discipline of employees in Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321, 1328 (11th Cir.
2011). I thank Professor Sandra Sperino for emphasizing this point. There are many
examples. One recent and prominent example is the Supreme Court’s seemingly superfluous
discussion of causation standards in the historic Bostock decision. See infra Section IV.C.
30. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17).
31. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634).
32. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213).
33. Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)).
34. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j)).
35. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
36. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–03, 12111–14, 12201, 12205a, 12210).
37. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (codified in
scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
38. Although one could make a case that the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 was the
most dramatic change in a law, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 was more overarching because
it changed more of the laws. Ironically, its most significant defect, subsequently revealed,
was the Supreme Court’s focus on the fact that Congress did not expressly amend the ADEA
and the ADA in the same ways that it amended Title VII.
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and created § 1981a, a freestanding section40 which provides for damages
and a concomitant right to a jury trial in intentional discrimination cases
under Title VII (when unavailable under § 1981) and the ADA. While the
1991 Act addressed a number of problems in employment discrimination
law and should be considered a positive development for civil rights
advocacy in many ways, it also bred much of the asymmetry and
uncertainty that currently exist in employment discrimination law. As one
might expect, changes to the employment discrimination laws as significant
as those effectuated by the 1991 Act constituted a politically charged and
contentious endeavor41 that required numerous compromises. 42 Such a
product of compromise often has inherent problems. It is hard to believe,
however, that a Congress that was trying to strengthen the discrimination
laws intended the asymmetry and uncertainty that resulted. Nonetheless, the
1991 Act permitted Supreme Court interpretations that produced these
results. Three particular decisions of the Court fomented most of the
asymmetry and uncertainty that currently exits. 43 Before considering those
decisions, some background on standards of causation44 and proof
frameworks45 is in order.
A. Proof Frameworks and Causation Standards for Individual Disparate
Treatment Claims
When Congress enacted Title VII in 1964, it included little explanation
of how discrimination was to be proven and analyzed. The foundation upon
39. H.R. REP. NO. 102-40, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess., at 2–4 (1991), as reprinted in 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 694–96 (noting the 1991 Act’s intent to overrule several Supreme Court
cases).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1)–(2).
41. The 1990 version of the bill was passed by Congress but vetoed by President
George H. W. Bush. See 136 CONG. REC. 31,827 (1990) (recording receipt of President
Bush’s veto of the 1990 Act).
42. Consider, for example, that the version of the 1990 Act first introduced did not cap
damages in § 1981a. See, e.g., Lynn Ridgeway Zehrt, Twenty Years of Compromise: How
the Caps on Damages in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 Codified Sex Discrimination, 25 YALE
J.L. & FEMINISM 249, 250 (2014).
43. See infra Section II.B, II.C.
44. Standards of causation refers to the extent to which the discriminatory intent must
cause the adverse employment action. The Supreme Court has interpreted the “because of”
language in the employment discrimination statutes to require “but for” causation, which
means that the adverse action would not have happened without the discriminatory intent.
Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176–77 (2009).
45. See infra note 49.
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which the Court built was the statutory language “because of.”46 Under the
scheme developed by the Court, proof and analysis of discrimination claims
turn on categorization. The first step considers which general theory a claim
is being brought under: disparate treatment (intentional discrimination) or
disparate impact (unintentional discrimination). 47 Second, if a claim is
categorized as individual disparate treatment, 48 the next step is determining
the appropriate proof framework49 with which to analyze the claim.
The disparate treatment proof frameworks are the most important
constructs in employment discrimination law for two reasons. First, the vast
majority of claims asserted under the federal employment discrimination
laws are individual disparate treatment claims. 50 Second, the proof
46. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
47. See Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977)
(distinguishing claims of disparate treatment from claims of disparate impact). The Court
has declared that there are only two theories of discrimination under Title VII. EEOC v.
Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2031–32 (2015). Disparate impact cases
also are analyzed according to proof frameworks that differ according to the statute at issue.
See Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228 (2005) (distinguishing the ADEA disparate
impact framework from that established in Title VII by the Civil Rights Act of 1991).
48. Systemic disparate treatment claims are evaluated under a less rigid framework
established in International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 336 (explaining that a
plaintiff alleging systemic disparate treatment must “establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that racial discrimination was the company’s standard operating procedure the
regular rather than the unusual practice”).
49. “Proof framework” refers to what must be proven, in what order, and on whom the
burden rests at each stage. In announcing the McDonnell Douglas or “pretext” proof
structure, the Supreme Court stated: “The case before us raises significant questions as to the
proper order and nature of proof in actions under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.”
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 793–94 (1973).
50. See John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment
Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 989 (1991) (breaking down federal
employment civil rights cases by plaintiff and showing that most cases are brought by
individual plaintiffs alleging disparate treatment claims); Linda Hamilton Krieger, Civil
Rights Perestroika: Intergroup Relations After Affirmative Action, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 1251,
1302 (1998) (“[B]y the end of the [1980s] the overwhelming majority of Title VII suits
involved individual claims of disparate treatment discrimination brought by individual
private litigants.”); Charles A. Sullivan, The Phoenix from the Ash: Proving Discrimination
by Comparators, 60 ALA. L. REV. 191, 198 (2009) (“[T]he vast majority of discrimination
claims in federal court . . . [are] individual disparate treatment cases.”). It seems likely that
the predominance of disparate treatment claims has increased since the enactment of the
Civil Rights Act of 1991 because the 1991 Act made compensatory and punitive damages
and jury trials available in intentional discrimination cases but not disparate impact cases. 42
U.S.C. § 1981a(a), (c).
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frameworks guide court analyses of claims at dispositive stages of
litigation, such as motions for summary judgment, motions for judgment as
a matter of law, and jury instructions. 51
Since 1989, there have been two proof frameworks applicable to
individual disparate treatment claims. After the development of the
McDonnell Douglas pretext structure52 in 1973 and the Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins53 mixed-motives structure54 in 1989, lower courts adopted a basis
51. The principal role of the frameworks is guiding the court’s analysis of motions
challenging the sufficiency of the evidence: summary judgment and judgment as a matter of
law. One of the proof structures—mixed motives—also shapes jury instructions, but there is
a split of authority regarding whether the pretext proof structure affects jury instructions.
Compare Townsend v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 294 F.3d 1232, 1241 (10th Cir. 2002)
(holding that a pretext instruction is required where a “rational finder of fact could
reasonably find the defendant’s explanation false” and could infer that the defendant is
covering up a discriminatory purpose), and Ratliff v. City of Gainesville, 256 F.3d 355, 364
(5th Cir. 2001) (reversing and remanding for a new trial because the district court failed to
give the jury an inference instruction), with Conroy v. Abraham Chevrolet-Tampa, Inc., 375
F.3d 1228, 1234–35 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that the failure to give the requested pretext
instruction was not reversible error), and Moore v. Robertson Fire Prot. Dist., 249 F.3d 786,
789 (8th Cir. 2001) (concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing
to give a pretext instruction), and Fite v. Digit. Equip. Corp., 232 F.3d 3, 7 (1st Cir. 2000)
(concluding that the district court is not required to give a pretext instruction telling the jury
that a prima facie case coupled with pretext permits them to infer discrimination). Thus, one
very significant uncertainty about the proof frameworks is at what stage of the litigation each
is applicable. See Sandra F. Sperino, Beyond McDonnell Douglas, 34 BERKELEY J. EMP. &
LAB. L. 257, 261–65 (2013) (explaining that circuit courts are split as to when in the
litigation they apply the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework).
52. The structure is as follows: at stage one, the plaintiff has the initial burden of
production of proving a prima facie case, which establishes a rebuttable presumption of
discrimination; at stage two, the burden of production shifts to the employer to produce
evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason; and at stage three, the burden of
production shifts to the plaintiff to prove that the employer’s legitimate reason is pretextual.
The burden of persuasion on the ultimate issue of discrimination remains with the plaintiff
throughout the analysis. See, e.g., Tex. Dep’t. of Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252–
56 (1981).
53. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
54. There are two stages: at stage one, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that
discrimination was a motivating factor or substantial factor of the adverse employment
action; and at stage two, the burden of persuasion shifts to the employer to prove that it
would have made the same decision for a nondiscriminatory reason. Under the Price
Waterhouse version, if the employer prevailed at the stage two “same-decision defense,” it
avoided liability. In the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress modified the Price Waterhouse
version of the framework by selecting “motivating factor” as the standard of causation at
stage one and providing that an employer’s satisfying the burden of persuasion on the same-
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for deciding which proof framework applied to a given disparate treatment
claim. If a claim involved circumstantial evidence of discrimination, the
McDonnell Douglas pretext framework applied.55 If a claim included direct
evidence, the mixed-motives analysis applied. 56 This “type of evidence”
distinction was articulated by Justice O’Connor in her concurring opinion in
Price Waterhouse.57 Although the standard was criticized because of the
amorphous distinction between circumstantial and direct evidence, 58 there
was at least a basis of distinction.
The plurality and concurring opinions in Price Waterhouse articulated a
second framework for analysis of individual disparate treatment claims. 59
Additionally, all Price Waterhouse opinions introduced the idea that it is
crucial to identify the standard of causation that a plaintiff must satisfy to
either win the case or shift the burden of persuasion to the defendant. 60 The
plurality opinion declared that the Title VII statutory language “because of”
does not require proof of but-for causation, 61 but Justice O’Connor’s
concurrence and the dissent disagreed. 62 In developing the two-part mixed
motives framework, the plurality asserted that a plaintiff must first prove
that discrimination was a “motivating part” (or motivating factor) in the
decision to take adverse action. 63 That proof would then shift the burden of

decision defense at stage two does not avoid liability, but instead limits the remedies
available to the plaintiff. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m), 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
55. See Kenneth R. Davis, Price-Fixing: Refining the Price Waterhouse Standard and
Individual Disparate Treatment Law, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 859, 875 (2004).
56. See id. at 873, 876; Michael J. Zimmer, The New Discrimination Law: Price
Waterhouse Is Dead, Whither McDonnell Douglas?, 53 EMORY L.J. 1887, 1910 (2004).
57. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 270–71 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
58. See, e.g., Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 852–53 (9th Cir. 2002)
(describing First Circuit Judge Selya’s categorization of various circuits’ approaches
following Price Waterhouse), aff’d, 539 U.S. 90 (2003).
59. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258 (plurality opinion).
60. See id. at 237–38.
61. Id. at 240.
62. See id. at 262 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“My disagreement stems from the
plurality’s conclusions concerning the substantive requirement of causation . . . .”); id. at 283
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“One of the principal reasons the plurality decision may sow
confusion is that it claims Title VII liability is unrelated to but-for causation . . . .”).
63. Id. at 258 (plurality opinion).
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persuasion to the defendant to avoid liability by proving it would have
made the same decision absent the discriminatory motive. 64
The relationship between standards of causation and proof frameworks is
important in the analytical scheme developed by the Court. Ironically, this
is a fundamental principle that the Supreme Court seems to disregard or
undervalue when deciding cases on proof frameworks, such as Desert
Palace, and cases on standards of causation, such as Nassar and Comcast.
The Court resolves questions about one matter without resolving questions
about the other, creating problems for attorneys and courts struggling to
understand the analysis applicable to claims.
Obviously, the mixed-motives framework incorporates standards of
causation, as a plaintiff must satisfy a specified standard of causation in
order to establish a prima facie case, and a defendant must disprove but-for
causation in order to establish the same-decision defense.65 The mixedmotives analysis simply bifurcates causation into two parts (motivating
factor and same decision) and shifts the burden of persuasion to the
defendant on the second part to disprove but-for causation.66
But it is not as obvious that a standard of causation is incorporated in the
McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis. However, it seems reasonable that it
must be given that the Supreme Court interprets the statutes as requiring
proof of causation. 67 What purpose would the proof framework serve if a
plaintiff could not satisfy the applicable standard of causation by
successfully navigating the proof framework? When it announced the
McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis, the Court did not declare that the
framework embodied a standard of causation. 68 There are at least two
64. See id. (“[T]he defendant may avoid a finding of liability only by proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same decision even if it had not
taken the plaintiff's [protected characteristic] into account.”).
65. See id.
66. See id. at 283 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (explaining that the plurality “adopts a butfor standard once it has placed the burden of proof as to causation upon the [defendant]”);
see also Martin J. Katz, Unifying Disparate Treatment (Really), 59 HASTINGS L.J. 643, 653
(2008) (“By proving ‘motivating factor’ causation, the plaintiff can shift the burden to the
defendant on the issue of ‘but-for’ causation (to prove a lack of ‘but-for’ causation).”).
67. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 238 (plurality opinion) (beginning analysis
by establishing the “specification of the standard of causation” under Title VII).
68. However, the but-for causation standard was at least implicit before McDonnell
Douglas was decided. See, e.g., Robert Belton, Causation in Employment Discrimination
Law, 34 WAYNE L. REV. 1235, 1258 (1988) (explaining that Supreme Court case law
supports two theories of causation, one of which is but-for causation).
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reasons for that omission. First, as the Court noted in Comcast, there was no
debate about standards of causation at the time McDonnell Douglas was
decided. 69 Second, as Professor Sullivan has explained, while “causation
takes center stage in direct evidence decisions,” in the pretext analysis,
causation is subsumed in the inference drawn from the prima facie case. 70
The Court did, however, equate proof of pretext with but-for causation in its
1976 decision McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co.71 Lower
courts have thus understood the pretext analysis as incorporating but-for
causation. 72
In the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress incorporated a modified
version of the Price Waterhouse mixed-motives analysis in Title VII. For
the first part of the analysis, Congress provided that a plaintiff could
establish an unlawful practice by demonstrating73 that a protected
characteristic was a “motivating factor” for an employment practice. 74
Congress chose the language “motivating factor” from the Price
Waterhouse plurality opinion rather than “substantial factor” favored by the
concurring opinions of Justices O’Connor and White. 75 The language
69. See Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Afr. Am.-Owned Media, 140 S. Ct. 1009, 1019
(2020) (“Because McDonnell Douglas arose in a context where but-for causation was the
undisputed test, it did not address causation standards.”).
70. Charles A. Sullivan, Accounting for Price Waterhouse: Proving Disparate
Treatment Under Title VII, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 1107, 1118 (1991).
71. 427 U.S. 273, 282 n.10 (1976).
72. See, e.g., Foster v. Univ. of Md.-E. Shore, 787 F.3d 243, 249 (4th Cir. 2015) (stating
that the McDonnell Douglas framework incorporates but-for causation).
73. The word “demonstrates” was defined by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to mean
“meets the burdens of production and persuasion.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(m).
74. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).
75. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989) (plurality opinion) (using
“motivating part” language); id. at 265 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (using “substantial factor”
language); id. at 259 (White, J., concurring) (using “substantial factor” language). It has
been argued that the use of different causation terms by the plurality and concurrences was
not intended to create different standards of causation. See Martin J. Katz, The Fundamental
Incoherence of Title VII: Making Sense of Causation in Disparate Treatment Law, 94 GEO.
L.J. 489, 508 (2006) [hereinafter Katz, The Fundamental Incoherence]. Indeed, the case
from which the Court derived its analysis equated the two standards. See Mt. Healthy City
Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977) (“[T]he burden was properly
placed upon respondent to show that his conduct was constitutionally protected, and that this
conduct was a ‘substantial factor’ or to put it in other words, that it was a ‘motivating
factor’ . . . .”). For her part, Justice O’Connor clearly intended a different standard of
causation. She considered the plurality’s “motivating factor” standard too lenient to justify a
shift in the burden of persuasion to the defendant on the second stage of the framework—the
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originally included in the bill was “contributing factor,” but it was later
changed to “motivating factor.”76 The House Report described this change
as “cosmetic” and stated that it “w[ould] not materially change the courts’
findings.”77 Congress also changed the analysis of Price Waterhouse by
providing that the same-decision defense is not a complete defense to
avoiding liability. Instead, liability is still imposed even if the employer
satisfies its burden on the same-decision defense, and the defense merely
limits the remedies that are available. 78
B. Desert Palace: The Court Interprets the Effect of the 1991 Act on the
Proof Frameworks
After the amendments to the 1991 Act, courts continued to decide which
framework was applicable to a claim by applying the circumstantial/direct
evidence distinction. 79 But in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, the Supreme
Court abrogated that distinction. 80 The Court held that a plaintiff asserting a
Title VII individual disparate treatment claim is not required to present
direct evidence in order to be entitled to a “motivating factor” jury
instruction.81 This meant that the mixed-motives analysis could be applied
in cases involving circumstantial evidence. The Court reasoned that when
Congress codified a modified version of mixed motives in the Civil Rights
Act of 1991, it said nothing of direct evidence. 82 Even Justice O’Connor,

same-decision defense. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 266–67 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring); see also Palmer v. Baker, 905 F.2d 1544, 1548 & n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
(recognizing the different causation standards in the plurality and concurrences and opting
for “substantial factor”).
76. Zimmer, supra note 56, at 1946 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 102-40, at 48 (1991), as
reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 586).
77. Id. at 1946 n.233 (quoting 137 CONG. REC. H3944-45 (daily ed. June 5, 1991)).
78. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(g)(2)(B). The limitation is significant, leaving the plaintiff with
no monetary remedy. See, e.g., Katz, The Fundamental Incoherence, supra note 75, at 534–
36 (discussing the inadequate remedies available when a defendant satisfies the samedecision defense).
79. See, e.g., Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 852–53 (9th Cir. 2002), aff’d,
539 U.S. 90 (2003); see also Robert Belton, Mixed-Motive Cases in Employment
Discrimination Law Revisited: A Brief Updated View of the Swamp, 51 MERCER L. REV.
651, 663–64 (2000).
80. See 539 U.S. 90, 100 (2003) (treating direct and circumstantial evidence alike).
81. Id. at 101–02.
82. Id. at 98–99.
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the creator of the evidence-based distinction, concurred, stating that
Congress did not adopt that line of demarcation. 83
The Desert Palace decision raised the question whether the McDonnell
Douglas pretext framework survived the decision. 84 If it did, what was the
new line of demarcation between the two frameworks? Subsequent
Supreme Court decisions have indicated that the pretext analysis survived
Desert Palace, 85 but no decision has suggested the new basis for deciding
which framework applies. Most confounding is the fact that, without
overruling Desert Palace, the Supreme Court has seemingly followed the
lead of lower courts86 and restored the direct/circumstantial dividing line. 87
C. Gross and Nassar: The Court Interprets the 1991 Act’s Effect on
Causation Standards
Six years after Desert Palace, the Court decided Gross v. FBL Financial
Services, Inc.88 When the Court granted certiorari in Gross,89 it appeared to
be merely a sequel to Desert Palace. The Court seemed poised to answer a
narrow question: whether Price Waterhouse’s direct/circumstantial
evidence line between pretext and mixed-motives analyses still applied to
83. Id. at 102 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
84. See, e.g., Dare v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 2d 987, 990–93 (D. Minn.
2003); Henry L. Chambers, Jr., The Effect of Eliminating Distinctions Among Title VII
Disparate Treatment Cases, 57 SMU L. REV. 83, 102–03 (2004); Melissa Hart, Subjective
Decisionmaking and Unconscious Discrimination, 56 ALA. L. REV. 741, 765–66 (2005);
Jeffrey A. Van Detta, “Le Roi Est Mort; Vive Le Roi!”: An Essay on the Quiet Demise of
McDonnell Douglas and the Transformation of Every Title VII Case After Desert Palace,
Inc. v. Costa into a “Mixed-Motives” Case, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 71, 76 (2003); Zimmer, supra
note 56, at 1929–32.
85. See Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1350 (2015) (discussing
pretext and citing McDonnell Douglas with approval); Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S.
44, 52 (2003) (stating that the only remaining question concerns pretext and quoting
McDonnell Douglas).
86. See, e.g., Etienne v. Spanish Lake Truck & Casino Plaza, L.L.C., 778 F.3d 473, 475
(5th Cir. 2015) (bifurcating the path of the claim based on whether the plaintiff has direct or
circumstantial evidence); Marable v. Marion Mil. Inst., 595 F. App’x 921, 924 (11th Cir.
2014) (explaining that the court uses the McDonnell Douglas framework when the plaintiff
produces only circumstantial evidence).
87. Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1345 (“[A] plaintiff can prove disparate treatment either (1) by
direct evidence that a workplace policy, practice, or decision relies expressly on a protected
characteristic, or (2) by using the burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell
Douglas.”).
88. 557 U.S. 167 (2009).
89. 526 F.3d 356 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 555 U.S. 1066 (2008) (mem.).
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ADEA claims even though it no longer applied to Title VII claims. 90
Different treatment of the two employment discrimination laws was
feasible because the Civil Rights Act of 1991, on which the Court focused
its analysis in Desert Palace, did not amend the ADEA in the same way
that it did Title VII.91 However, the Court’s decision in Gross turned out to
be much more than a Desert Palace sequel, as the Court rendered a decision
that answered a broader question.
The Court held that the “motivating factor” standard of causation and
mixed-motives proof framework do not even apply to ADEA cases. 92 The
Court reasoned that Congress amended Title VII through the 1991 Act to
add the “motivating factor” standard of causation and the mixed-motives
analysis, but it did not similarly amend the ADEA. 93 When Congress
amends one statute but not another, “it is presumed to have acted
intentionally.”94 The Court noted that the only standard of causation in the
ADEA is the original “because of” language, 95 which the Court interpreted
as necessarily meaning but-for causation.96 Thus, the burden of persuasion
is on the plaintiff to prove but-for causation, and the burden never shifts to
the defendant.97 Moreover, the Court rejected the argument that the Price
Waterhouse version of the mixed-motives framework continued to apply to
the ADEA.98
Having concluded that the ADEA requires proof of but-for causation, the
Court in Gross would have created asymmetry, but not uncertainty. The
Court went further, however, exacerbating uncertainty regarding proof
frameworks. In a footnote detailing differences between the ADEA and
Title VII, the Court noted that it had never decided whether the McDonnell

90. See Kevin Russell, Argument Preview: Gross v. FBL Financial Services,
SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 30, 2009, 3:51 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2009/03/argumentpreview-gross-v-fbl-financial-services/.
91. Id. (observing that the Petitioner acknowledged that Congress did not mention the
ADEA when it legislatively overruled Price Waterhouse in the 1991 Act).
92. Gross, 557 U.S. at 180.
93. Id. at 174–75.
94. Id. at 174.
95. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1)–(2).
96. Gross, 557 U.S. at 176.
97. See id. at 180.
98. Id. at 178–79.
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Douglas proof framework applies to ADEA claims. 99 Although the Court
had indeed noted this point in prior decisions, lower courts, interpreting the
pretext analysis as embodying but-for causation,100 had continued to apply
it to ADEA claims.101 The Court’s holding in Gross—that the ADEA
requires but-for causation—presented an opportunity to clarify that the
pretext framework does incorporate but-for causation and is applicable to
the ADEA. The Court declined to do so. Thus, Gross demonstrates the
Court’s apparent lack of either appreciation or concern about the practical
difficulties it creates when it fails to attend to the relationship between
causation standards and proof frameworks.
102
University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar was a true
sequel to Gross, although one that did not inevitably follow from it. In
Nassar, the Court held that the motivating factor standard and the mixedmotives framework are not available under Title VII’s anti-retaliation
provision;103 rather, but-for causation is required. 104 The Court’s rationale
was the same as in Gross.105 The Court thus escalated the asymmetry by
making a causation standard and proof framework that are applicable under
the anti-discrimination provision of Title VII inapplicable under the antiretaliation provision. The Court also discussed the relationship between
“because of” and “motivating factor” in the anti-discrimination provision of
99. Id. at 175 n.2 (first citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133,
142 (2000); and then citing O’Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308,
311 (1996)).
100. Although the Court did not declare in McDonnell Douglas itself that the framework
measures but-for causation, it did suggest this proposition. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail
Transp. Corp., 427 U.S. 273, 282 n.10 (1976) (explaining that in the pretext context “no
more is required to be shown than that [the protected characteristic] was a ‘but for’ cause”).
101. See, e.g., Nicholson v. Securitas Sec. Servs. USA, Inc., 830 F.3d 186, 189 (5th Cir.
2016) (applying the burden shifting framework in McDonnell Douglas and articulating a
but-for causation requirement). But see Martin J. Katz, Reclaiming McDonnell Douglas, 83
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 109, 136–37 (2007) (positing that the McDonnell Douglas analysis,
despite widespread belief to the contrary, does not prove but-for causation).
102. 570 U.S. 338 (2013).
103. See id. at 362 (requiring plaintiffs making a Title VII retaliation claim, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-3(a), to establish but-for causation).
104. Nassar, 570 U.S. at 360.
105. See id. at 360–61 (relying on Congress’s failure to amend the anti-retaliation
provision, § 2000e-3(a), to include the “motivating factor” standard); Gross v. FBL Fin.
Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 174 (2009) (“We cannot ignore Congress’ decision to amend
Title VII’s relevant provisions but not make similar changes to the ADEA. When Congress
amends one statutory provision but not another, it is presumed to have acted intentionally.”).
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Title VII: “For one thing, § 2000e-2(m) is not itself a substantive bar on
discrimination. Rather, it is a rule that establishes the
causation standard for
106
proving a violation defined elsewhere in Title VII.”
D. The Wrongs Done by and to the Civil Rights Act of 1991
It was not inevitable that an act of Congress would be necessary to repair
employment discrimination law. The Court could have interpreted the 1991
Act differently, as indicated by the dissents in Gross and Nassar.107 The
Court’s mistake in Desert Palace, which was a unanimous decision,108 was
not its method of statutory interpretation. Rather, the Court failed to
consider the ramifications of the decision on the determination of which of
the two proof frameworks applies to any given individual disparate
treatment claim—an omission that has not been remedied in the subsequent
eighteen years. The Court’s interpretations of the 1991 Act have not been
unreasonable in terms of statutory interpretation. 109 They have, however,
been deleterious from both a practice and policy perspective because the
Court has opted for interpretations that have made employment
discrimination law less comprehensible, more uncertain, and more
asymmetrical.
The POWADA, as currently written, would right one of the wrongs
(asymmetry of causation standards), but not in the best way. It would most
likely also leave the more significant wrong (uncertainty regarding proof
frameworks) unredressed. Congress, not the Court, should respond to these
problems, particularly because the Supreme Court has created this situation
based on its interpretations of Congress’s Civil Rights Act of 1991.
Congress can accomplish this by amending the POWADA bills and passing
a law that would right both wrongs in clear language that does not permit
alternative interpretations.
The need for congressional action is urgent for several reasons. First, the
uncertainty regarding which proof structure applies to any given individual
106. Nassar, 557 U.S. at 355.
107. Gross, 557 U.S. at 180–82 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (referring to the majority’s
interpretation of the ADEA and the 1991 Act as “unnecessary lawmaking” and in “utter
disregard” of Congress’s intent); Nassar, 570 U.S. at 374–77 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(referring to the majority’s interpretation of the 1991 Act as “strange logic” and observing
other interpretations).
108. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 90 (2003).
109. But see Deborah A. Widiss, Undermining Congressional Overrides: The Hydra
Problem in Statutory Interpretation, 90 TEX. L. REV. 859, 927–29 (2012) (arguing that the
Court’s interpretation in Gross of a statutory override was not reasonable).
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disparate treatment case is a problem of great import, and its practical
ramifications affect parties, attorneys, and judges on a daily basis. Second,
it matters greatly that the law is actually comprehensible and that the
principles and structures developed by the courts and Congress are
reasonably tailored to describe and address the violations of law for which
they are designed. Finally, the most recent version of the POWADA is the
latest example of a failure of Congress and the Supreme Court to work
together to develop law that is reasonably understandable, cogent, and
usable. Although the Court is more to blame, Congress is in a better
position to repair the law. Starting with the foundation of the POWADA
and revising that bill in some significant way may provide an opportunity to
effect such repair, particularly in light of the options provided by the Court
in Babb.
III. The Protecting Older Workers Against Discrimination Act: A Bill to
Install a Uniform Standard of Causation
The POWADA was first introduced in 2009 110 as a bill that would
overturn the result in Gross and amend the ADEA to include the
“motivating factor” standard and the mixed-motives framework.111 The bill
also aimed to avoid the mistake Congress made in the Civil Rights Act of
1991 of amending only one employment discrimination law. Instead, it
provided that the causation standard and proof framework would apply to
any federal employment discrimination law, any anti-retaliation provision,
and any constitutional provision forbidding discrimination. 112 The bill
would have made the ADEA symmetrical regarding causation standards
and proof structures with Title VII, but it would have created the same
uncertainty that exists in Title VII regarding which proof structure applies
to a particular individual disparate treatment claim. In fact, the bill
expressly stated that “[e]very method for proving either such violation,
including the evidentiary framework set forth in McDonnell-Douglas . . .
shall be available to the plaintiff.” 113 The foregoing provision was the
greatest flaw of the 2009 version of the POWADA. Like so many courts,
the congressional drafters felt the need to pay homage to the McDonnell
Douglas pretext analysis. In doing so, had the bill passed, they would have
110.
111.
112.
113.

S. 1756, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 3721, 111th Cong. (2009).
S. 1756 § 2; H.R. 3721 § 2.
S. 1756 § 2; H.R. 3721 § 2.
S. 1756 § 3; H.R. 3721 § 3.
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codified the uncertainty regarding proof frameworks. Relatedly, the bill
would not have addressed the uncertainty regarding the interaction between
the two causation standards (but for and motivating factor) co-existing in
the same statute—a problem existing in Title VII since the 1991 Act. 114
The most recent version of the POWADA was introduced in Congress in
2019 and passed by the House in 2020.115 This version differs from the
prior iteration in several respects. It specifically amends particular
provisions in the ADEA, Title VII, the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, and anti-retaliation provisions rather than using catchall provisions
referring to all federal employment discrimination statutes. 116 It also does
not include a specific reference to the McDonnell Douglas analysis as its
predecessor did. 117 Instead, its provisions state that plaintiffs may use any
form or type of evidence, are required only to produce sufficient evidence
for a reasonable fact finder to find an unlawful practice, and are not
required to prove sole causation. 118 These provisions are significant
improvements over those in the 2009 version of the POWADA. These
provisions also give courts the latitude to interpret the Act as liberating
individual disparate treatment analysis from the strictures of the proof
frameworks.119 However, the most recent version of the bill will almost
certainly not produce that result, as the language does not expressly require
that result. There is nothing to which courts cling more tenaciously than the
proof frameworks, and most particularly the McDonnell Douglas

114. See supra Section II.C.
115. Protecting Older Workers Against Discrimination Act, H.R. 1230, 116th Cong.
(2020); see also H.R. 1230-Protecting Older Workers Against Discrimination Act,
CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/1230/actions (last
visited Jan. 5, 2021) (listing the bill as introduced in 2019 and passed in 2020).
116. H.R. 1230 § 2.
117. See id.; S. 1756, 111th Cong. § 3 (2009); H.R. 3721, 111th Cong. § 3 (2009).
118.
. . . In establishing an unlawful practice under this Act, including under
paragraph (1) or by any other method of proof, a complaining party—
“(A) may rely on any type or form of admissible evidence and need only
produce evidence sufficient for a reasonable trier of fact to find that an
unlawful practice occurred under this Act; and
(B) shall not be required to demonstrate that age or an activity protected by
subsection (d) was the sole cause of a practice.”
H.R. 1230 § 2(a)(1).
119. See infra Section V.B.2.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol73/iss3/2

2021]

INTOLERABLE ASYMMETRY & UNCERTAINTY

439

framework.120 If Congress intends to dispatch with the pretext framework or
both frameworks, it will need to do so expressly.
IV. Comcast and Babb (and Bostock)
The Court’s 2020 decisions in Comcast Corp. v. National Ass’n of
African American-Owned Media121 and Babb v. Wilkie122 exacerbate the
problems initiated by Desert Palace, Gross, and Nassar. They draw on
Gross and Nassar for the tenet that but-for causation is the default standard
of causation in employment discrimination and other legislation. 123 The
discussion of standards of causation in Bostock v. Clayton County124 is
somewhat enigmatic, as it seems peripheral to the issue the Court was
deciding.125 Nonetheless, the discussion does demonstrate how central the
Court considers standard of causation to resolving issues under the
discrimination statutes.
A. Comcast
Comcast involved a claim of discrimination under § 1981 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866.126 It was not an employment discrimination claim.
Section 1981 is a civil rights statute enacted by Congress in 1866 during
Reconstruction. 127 The statue provides that “[a]ll persons . . . shall have the
same right . . . to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, [and] give
evidence . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens.” 128
The plaintiff, an African American entrepreneur, owned media company
ESN, which was comprised of seven television networks.129 Comcast, a
television network conglomerate, and ESN could not come to an agreement
120. See supra Section II.B.
121. 140 S. Ct. 1009 (2020).
122. 140 S. Ct. 1168 (2020).
123. See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 180 (2009) (holding that a plaintiff
must prove but-for causation to prevail under the ADEA); Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v.
Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 362 (2013) (holding that a plaintiff bringing a retaliation claim must
prove that “his or her protected activity was the but-for cause of the alleged adverse action
by the employer”).
124. 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
125. See, e.g., id. at 1757 (Alito, J., dissenting) (accusing the majority of “spending many
pages discussing matters [including causation] that are beside the point”).
126. Comcast, 140 S. Ct. at 1013.
127. See id. at 1015.
128. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a).
129. Comcast, 140 S. Ct. at 1013.
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for Comcast to carry the ESN networks. 130 When ESN sued Comcast for
race discrimination under § 1981, Comcast argued that its viewers preferred
a different type of programing not offered by ESN. 131 The district court
granted a 12(b)(6) motion, dismissing the action and holding that ESN had
not plausibly pled but-for causation based on race. 132 The Ninth Circuit
reversed, holding that the district court applied the wrong standard of
causation to a § 1981 claim. 133 Instead, the Ninth Circuit reasoned, the
district court should have applied the standard that race “played ‘some
role’” in the decision.134 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed
the Ninth Circuit, holding that the trial court applied the correct standard of
but-for causation.135
The Court began its analysis by observing that the default standard of
causation, derived from tort law, is but-for causation.136 The Court also
noted that the “essential elements”—what a plaintiff must prove to
prevail—remain the same throughout the litigation. 137 Thus, what a plaintiff
must allege in her complaint is consistent with what she must prove at
trial.138 Section 1981 says nothing about standards of causation, and the
Court found nothing in the statutory text, legislative history, or Court
precedent to persuade it that § 1981 presented an exception to what the
Court views as the default rule for statutory torts.139
The Court further declined the plaintiff’s invitation to import the
“motivating factor” standard from Title VII into § 1981.140 First, the Court
rejected the plaintiff’s reliance on Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins because
Congress superseded that decision with a statutory version of the
“motivating factor” standard in the Civil Rights Act of 1991.141 In the 1991
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. (citing Nat’l Ass’n of Afr. Am.-Owned Media v. Comcast Corp., 743 F. App’x
106, 107 (9th Cir. 2018) (mem.)).
135. Id. at 1014, 1019.
136. Id. at 1014.
137. Id. This should be a very significant point that would mandate some clarification
regarding causation standards and proof frameworks, but I do not think that it will provoke
such clarification. See infra text accompanying notes 159–60.
138. Comcast, 140 S. Ct. at 1014.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1017–18.
141. Id. at 1017.
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Act, Congress amended Title VII to insert the motivating factor standard
into the statute.142 Although the 1991 Act also amended § 1981, it did not
insert the “motivating factor” standard into that statute.143 Thus, employing
the interpretive tool invoked in Gross and Nassar, the Court reasoned that
when Congress simultaneously amends one statue in one way and another
in another way, the difference in language implies a difference in
meaning.144 The Court also rejected the argument that the statutory
language to “make and enforce contracts” requires a motivating factor
standard because it includes claims for contract process as well as contract
outcomes.145 The Court explained that it did not need to resolve whether §
1981 covers process claims because it did not find that “motivating factor”
is necessarily the appropriate standard for process-based claims.146
The Court then explained that the plaintiff, unable to “latch onto” either
Price Waterhouse or the Civil Rights Act of 1991, attempted to invoke the
McDonnell Douglas pretext framework, arguing that it supported the
analysis advocated for by the plaintiff. 147 The Court also rejected that
argument. 148 It explained that McDonnell Douglas was decided at a time
when the but-for causation standard was the undisputed standard in
employment discrimination law. 149 Thus, the Court in McDonnell Douglas
said nothing about the standard of causation. 150 The Court left unresolved
whether the McDonnell Douglas proof framework may be relevant to
analyzing a claim under § 1981, saying, “[w]hether or not McDonnell
Douglas has some useful role to play in § 1981 cases,” it provides no basis
for adopting a “motivating factor” standard for evaluating the sufficiency of
pleadings under § 1981.151
There is nothing surprising or remarkable about the Comcast decision or
its rationale. The Court extended its default-rule rationale from Gross,
Nassar, and other precedents to hold that the standard for § 1981 is but-for

142. Id.
143. Id. at 1017–18.
144. Id. at 1018; see Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 174–75 (2009); Univ.
of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 353 (2013).
145. Comcast, 140 S. Ct. at 1018 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 1018–19.
148. Id. at 1019.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
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causation. 152 However, it is remarkable that the Court extended that
rationale even in the absence of any statutory language suggesting a
causation standard.153
In this way, the Court increased the asymmetry in employment
discrimination law. One could argue that there was no increase because §
1981 now has a causation standard identical to all employment
discrimination laws other than Title VII. 154 However, asymmetry between
Title VII and § 1981 is more significant because claims of race
discrimination are usually asserted under both statutes. 155 Now a factfinder
will have to apply different standards of causation to the claims. 156 Before
Comcast, courts did not conduct separate analyses. 157
On the issue of proof frameworks, the Court increased both uncertainty
and asymmetry by casually passing over whether the McDonnell Douglas
pretext analysis is relevant to evaluating claims under § 1981.158
The discussion in Comcast—what a plaintiff must prove remains
constant throughout the litigation—should provoke resolution of the
relationship between the proof frameworks and standards of causation. It
should also sound the death knell for the McDonnell Douglas framework.
The elements a plaintiff must prove remain constant throughout the case.
Thus, if a plaintiff’s Title VII claim is analyzed under the pretext
framework, which incorporates but-for causation,159 on a defendant’s
motion for summary judgment, the jury cannot be given an instruction that

152. Id.; see Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 180 (2009) (holding that a
plaintiff must prove but-for causation to prevail under the ADEA); Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med.
Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 362 (2013) (holding that a plaintiff bringing a retaliation claim
must prove that “his or her protected activity was the but-for cause of the alleged adverse
action by the employer”).
153. I thank Professor Sperino for making this point.
154. Although the Court has not yet resolved the standard of causation applicable under
the ADA, see infra note 205, it is likely but-for causation.
155. See, e.g., CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 445 (2008) (explaining that
the plaintiff brought claims of race discrimination under both Title VII and § 1981).
156. See Kilgore v. FedEx Freight, 458 F. Supp. 3d 973, 978 (N.D. Ill. 2020) (observing
that Title VII and § 1981 claims have different causation standards).
157. See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 186 (1989) (providing
that § 1981 claims should be evaluated under the same proof framework used for Title VII
claims); Humphries v. CBOCS W., Inc., 474 F.3d 387, 403–04 (7th Cir. 2007) (applying the
same prima facie requirements to Title VII claims and § 1981 claims).
158. See supra text accompanying note 151.
159. See supra text accompanying notes 65–72.
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a plaintiff need prove only motivating factor.160 Although Comcast should
require resolution of uncertainty regarding proof frameworks and standards
of causation, it is very unlikely that it will do so. The persistence of but-for
causation and the pretext analysis for Title VII claims for eighteen years
after Desert Palace suggests that for such a change to occur the Court must
expressly mandate such outcomes rather than hint at them.
In one of the first post-Comcast opinions, Kilgore v. FedEx Freight,161
the district court considered a defendant’s motion for summary judgment on
the plaintiff’s claim of race discrimination under both Title VII and § 1981.
The court explained that different standards of causation now apply to the
two statutes after Comcast—motivating factor for Title VII and but-for for
§ 1981.162 The court then brought some uniformity to the question by
saying that the standard for summary judgment is the same: whether the
evidence would permit a reasonable juror to find that the plaintiff suffered
an adverse job action because of race. 163 Then the court proceeded to apply
the McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis to the issue, making no distinction
between the Title VII and § 1981 claims. 164 Was that correct after Comcast?
We do not know. Furthermore, it seems the Kilgore court could have
addressed the question by evaluating the evidence under the summary
judgment standard that it articulated without invoking the pretext
framework.165

160. Numerous cases have suggested, incorrectly, that the pretext and mixed-motives
analyses apply at different stages of the litigation, and thus it is not necessary to choose
between them. See, e.g., Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 856–57 (9th Cir. 2002),
aff’d, 539 U.S. 90 (2003) (asserting that McDonnell Douglas and mixed-motive frameworks
apply in different phases of litigation); Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 735
(8th Cir. 2004) (discussing when in litigation the McDonnell Douglas framework applies
and when a mixed-motive jury instruction is appropriate); White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.,
533 F.3d 381, 395–96 (6th Cir. 2008) (discussing that the plaintiff’s burden of proof depends
on the phase of litigation), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1235 (2009).
161. 458 F. Supp. 3d 973 (N.D. Ill. 2020).
162. Id. at 975, 978.
163. See id. at 979.
164. See id. at 978–80 (explaining that the McDonnell Douglas framework applies to
both Title VII and § 1981 claims and then applying this framework).
165. I will suggest below that this idea is a basis for radically reforming disparate
treatment law by dispatching with the causation standards and proof frameworks. See infra
Section V.B.2.
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B. Babb
In Babb, the Court considered the standard of causation under the federal
sector provision of the ADEA. That provision provides that personnel
decisions “shall be made free from any discrimination based on age.” 166 The
government argued that a but-for causation standard based on the statutory
text should be the default rule recognized in other employment
discrimination decisions of the Court.167 The district court, analyzing the
claim under the McDonnell Douglas pretext framework, granted summary
judgment in favor of the government. 168 On appeal, plaintiff Babb argued
that it was a mistake to apply the McDonnell Douglas analysis to a mixedmotives claim. 169 The plaintiff argued that the federal sector provision does
not require proof of but-for causation; instead, there is a violation if an
employer considered age in the decision-making process.170
The Court began with the statutory language. Parsing the language, the
Court concluded that there are two parts with two different causation
standards: age must be a but-for cause of discrimination in the adverse
employment action, but not a but-for cause of the personnel decision
process itself.171 Thus, the statute does not require proof that the decision
would have come out differently if age had not been considered. 172 There is
a violation if age plays any part in the decision. 173 The decision must be
“made in a way that is untainted by such discrimination.”174
The government’s argument for a but-for causation standard was based
on Supreme Court precedent, including Gross and Nassar, interpreting
different language in other statutes as supporting the default rule of but-for
causation. 175 The Court distinguished those decisions as interpreting
different statutory language. 176
The Court did not find it anomalous that Congress would hold the federal
government to a more stringent standard in the federal sector provision than
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Babb v. Wilkie, 140 S. Ct. 1168, 1171 (2020) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 633a(a)).
Id. at 1172.
Id. at 1171–72.
Id. at 1172.
Id.
Id. at 1173–74.
Id. at 1174.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1175–76.
Id. at 1176.
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it holds private employers and state and local governments. In other words,
the Babb interpretation makes it easier for plaintiffs to prove age
discrimination claims against the federal government than for plaintiffs to
prove age discrimination against private employers and state and local
governments.177 The Court then turned to the interaction between the two
causation standards that it found in the federal sector provision. A plaintiff
proves a violation of the provision if he demonstrates that age was
considered and resulted in unequal consideration.178 But that showing
entitles a plaintiff to only “injunctive or other forward-looking relief.”179 In
order to be entitled to other remedies, such as reinstatement, back pay,
compensatory damages, or other forms of relief related to the result of an
employment decision, the plaintiff must prove but-for causation of the
employment action.180 The Court noted that this was similar to the
remedies-matched-to-violations scheme developed by the Court for claims
under § 1983 for violations of the Equal Protection Clause181 and violations
of First Amendment rights.182 Although the Court did not say so, it also is
similar to the bifurcated remedy structure in the statutory version of the
mixed-motives analysis in Title VII created by Congress in the Civil Rights
Act of 1991,183 except it does not include the shifting burden of
persuasion.184
Justice Thomas, dissenting, saw no basis for deviating from the default
rule of but-for causation and engrafting a bifurcated remedial scheme from
Supreme Court precedent that is unsupported by statutory language. 185
While the Court’s opinion in Comcast was not surprising, its opinion in
Babb did include a couple of surprises. First, the Court had a long streak of

177. Id. at 1176–77.
178. See id. at 1174 (explaining that an employer violates the ADEA by considering age
even when that consideration did not result in any difference in outcome).
179. Id. at 1178.
180. Id. at 1177–78.
181. Id. at 1178 (citing Texas v. Lesage, 528 U.S. 18, 21–22 (1999)).
182. Id. (citing Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 285 (1977)).
183. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (stating that an unlawful employment practice exists
“when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also
motivated the practice”); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (limiting relief for claims brought
under § 2000e-2(m) to declaratory relief and injunctive relief).
184. See id. § 2000e-2(m).
185. Babb, 140 S. Ct. at 1179 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2021

446

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:419

applying the default rule of but-for causation, and Babb broke that streak. 186
Second and most surprising, the Court engrafted a two-part causation
standard onto statutory language that did not clearly require it. The adoption
of a two-tier causation analysis is surprising in light of Gross. Although the
shifting burden of persuasion in the Price Waterhouse mixed-motives
analysis is a distinction from the analysis in Babb, the Court in Gross had
shown antipathy for the two-tier analysis developed in Price Waterhouse.
The Court stated in Gross that if Price Waterhouse were decided by the
2009 Court, it may not have developed that framework. 187
Babb, recognizing a new standard of causation and essentially a new
proof framework, exacerbated the asymmetry but not the uncertainty in
employment discrimination law. The opinion also should provide Congress
with food for thought about how to amend the employment discrimination
statutes.
C. Bostock
Bostock is a monumental decision in which the Court decided that sexual
orientation and transgender status are covered by the language of Title VII
as enacted in 1964: “because of . . . sex.”188 Standards of causation and
proof frameworks seemingly would have little to do with resolution of that
issue. Yet, the majority opinion and one of the dissenting opinions devote
some attention to discussion of standards of causation. 189 While none of that
discussion is likely to exacerbate or ameliorate the asymmetry or
uncertainty issues discussed herein, it does demonstrate the central role that
the Court sees standards of causation playing in the discrimination statutes.
In the majority opinion, Justice Gorsuch discussed the but-for standard,
saying that the “because of” language incorporates that “simple” and
“traditional” standard.190 That was no revelation, of course, as the Court

186. Id. at 1182 (“Today’s decision is inconsistent with the default rule underlying our
interpretation of antidiscrimination statutes and our precedents, which have consistently
applied that rule.”).
187. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 178–79 (2009).
188. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
189. See Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1739–40 (2020) (discussing
causation standards); id. at 1775 (Alito, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority’s discussion
of causation standards is irrelevant to the essential question at issue).
190. Id. at 1739 (majority opinion).
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already had declared that in Gross and Nassar.191 The Bostock Court
observed that but-for causation can be a “sweeping standard” because it
does not require sole causation and instead imposes liability even if there is
more than one but-for cause.192 The Court also noted that the Civil Rights
Act of 1991 added to Title VII a “more forgiving,” meaning less demanding
for the plaintiff, standard—“motivating factor.”193 Nonetheless, the Court
declared that its analysis is not dependent on the “motivating factor”
standard.194 Indeed, the role that but-for causation played in the Court’s
analysis is to say that if sex is a but-for cause of discrimination, Title VII
imposes liability and it does not matter that something else—such as to
which sex one is attracted—is also a cause.195
Justice Alito’s dissent, joined by Justice Thomas, finds the majority’s
discussion of but-for causation tangential to the issue before the Court,
saying, “so what?”196 The issue, according to the dissent, is whether Title
VII imposes liability if sexual orientation or gender identity was a
motivating factor in the employer’s decision. 197 It seems that the dissent is
correct that the discussion of causation standards diverts attention from the
issue before the Court. To the extent that the standard of causation was
relevant to that issue, the majority’s focus on “because of” rather than
“motivating factor” may have been appropriate, especially given that the
Court was determining whether the language enacted in 1964 encompassed
the characteristic at issue.198
Although not needed in the majority opinion, the discussion of standards
of causation in Bostock does little to change the asymmetry and uncertainty
issues that persist in employment discrimination law. It recognized the two
standards that co-exist in Title VII, but it did nothing to clarify their
interaction. The Bostock discussion does, however, highlight how central
the Court believes causation standards are to resolving issues under the
statutes. Moreover, it further ensconced the tort standard of but-for
191. Id. (first citing Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009); and then
citing Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 346, 360 (2013)). See also supra
Part II.
192. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1739.
193. Id. at 1739–40.
194. Id. at 1740.
195. Id. at 1742.
196. Id. at 1757 (Alito, J., dissenting).
197. Id.
198. See id. at 1738–40 (majority opinion) (examining the words of the statute as they
would have been understood in 1964).
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causation as the fundamental and default standard for the discrimination
statutes.
V. Righting the Wrongs
A. The POWADA Approach—Overturning Gross and Nassar and Providing
for a Uniform “Motivating Factor” Standard
The POWADA has been hailed as a proposal that would fix a major
problem and asymmetry in discrimination law. 199 Specifically, plaintiffs
alleging age discrimination under the ADEA must satisfy a different, higher
standard of causation than those alleging discrimination based on color,
race, sex, national origin, or religion under Title VII, as amended by the
Civil Rights Act of 1991.200 The AARP 201 and others202 have argued that it
is bad policy to require an age discrimination plaintiff to prove a higher
standard of causation, thus making it more difficult for age discrimination
plaintiffs to win cases. For example, one commentator decries the Gross
decision as “le[aving] millions of older workers with scant protection from
age discrimination in employment for the past decade.” 203
Although it has attracted less attention than Gross, the Court’s opinion in
Nassar exacerbated the problem by extending the holding of Gross by
requiring Title VII retaliation plaintiffs to satisfy the more demanding butfor standard.204 Although the Court has not yet addressed the issue, most

199. See, e.g., Patricia Barnes, Finally, U.S. House Will Address Disastrous U.S.
Supreme Court Ruling on Age Discrimination, FORBES (Jan. 13, 2020, 1:16 PM EST),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/patriciagbarnes/2020/01/13/finally-us-house-will-addressdisastrous-us-supreme-court-ruling-on-age-discrimination/#17472e635efd.
200. Id.
201. See Kenneth Terrell, AARP Urges Congress to Strengthen Age Discrimination
Laws, AARP (May 21, 2019), https://www.aarp.org/politics-society/advocacy/info2019/powada-age-discrimination.html; GS STRATEGY GRP., PROTECTING OLDER WORKERS
AGAINST DISCRIMINATION ACT NATIONAL PUBLIC OPINION POLL 4 (June 2012),
https://www.aarp.org/content/dam/aarp/research/surveys_statistics/work_and_retirement/po
wada-national.pdf.
202. See, e.g., Barnes, supra note 199; Editorial, Age Discrimination, N.Y. TIMES (July 6,
2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/07/opinion/07tue2.html (calling for Congress to
overturn Gross).
203. See Barnes, supra note 199.
204. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 362 (2013) (holding that a
plaintiff bringing a retaliation claim must prove that “his or her protected activity was the
but-for cause of the alleged adverse action by the employer”).
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lower courts extend the rationale of Gross to the ADA. 205 The POWADA
would legislatively overturn Gross and Nassar and provide that the less
stringent “motivating factor” causation standard applies to the federal
employment discrimination laws.206
Gross and Nassar were bad decisions for employment discrimination
law from both practice and policy perspectives. It would be beneficial for
Congress to overturn those decisions and make a uniform causation
standard applicable under all employment discrimination statutes. However,
neither the 2019-20 bill nor its 2010 predecessor chose a standard that is
likely to make plaintiffs much more successful.
It is now clear that “motivating factor” has been, in Professor Sullivan’s
words, “a noble failure.”207 The standard has not been used by plaintiffs or
courts208 as much as would have been anticipated, 209 and it does not appear
that it has resulted in a noticeably improved success rate for plaintiffs. 210
Why has motivating factor not transformed Title VII law? Sullivan posits
three reasons: (1) “motivating factor” is too hard (or unfamiliar) a concept
for judges and lawyers; (2) “motivating factor” is not too hard to
understand, but too radical; and (3) plaintiffs opt out of urging its

205. Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d 957, 962 (7th Cir. 2010)
(applying “but-for” causation to ADA claims in light of Gross); Lewis v. Humboldt
Acquisition Corp., 681 F.3d 312, 321 (6th Cir. 2012) (applying “but-for” causation to ADA
claims in light of Gross); Gentry v. E. W. Partners Club Mgmt. Co., Inc., 816 F.3d 228, 234
(4th Cir. 2016) (joining the Sixth and Seventh Circuits in applying but-for causation in light
of Gross). But see Hoffman v. Baylor Health Care Sys., 597 F. App’x 231, 235 n.12 (5th
Cir. 2015) (stating that the “motivating factor” test rather than but-for causation applies to
claims brought under the ADA); Siring v. Or. State Bd. of Higher Educ., 977 F. Supp. 2d
1058, 1063 (D. Or. 2013) (applying the “motivating factor” test to claims brought under the
ADA).
206. Protecting Older Workers Against Discrimination Act, H.R. 1230, 116th Cong. § 2
(2020); Protecting Older Workers Against Discrimination Act, S. 485, 116th Cong. § 3
(2019).
207. See Sullivan, Making Too Much, supra note 13, at 400.
208. It is difficult to know whether plaintiffs are not urging application of motivating
factor, courts are not accepting the arguments, or a combination. Presumably, it is the court,
not the parties, that decides under which framework to analyze a claim. See Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 247 n.12 (1989) (explaining that the district court
must decide whether the case is a pretext or mixed-motives case).
209. Sullivan, Making Too Much, supra note 13, at 396.
210. Id. at 366 & n.42, 378.
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application because it invokes the stage two same-decision limitation of
remedies. 211 Those are all good explanations, yet there are others.
First, the Supreme Court, even before Price Waterhouse, regarded the
employment discrimination statutes as statutory torts. In her Price
Waterhouse concurrence, Justice O’Connor discussed tort causation
standards and the underlying tort case law. 212 “Motivating factor” is not a
tort law causation standard, and the Supreme Court and lower courts are
comfortable importing tort principles into employment discrimination law,
which in their view, creates statutory torts.213
Second, and more significantly, however, “motivating factor” anchors
the mixed-motives proof framework in the discredited idea that
discriminators typically are motivated by discriminatory impulses of which
they are aware at the time of decision and on which they act. This is how
the plurality explained “motivating factor” in Price Waterhouse.214 The
work of Professor Linda Hamilton Krieger and many other scholars has
undermined the idea that most discrimination is the product of conscious
motivation.215 More generally, “motivating factor” embodies a fundamental
misunderstanding of motives as causes of people’s actions. 216
Even if Congress wishes to lower the standard of causation in the
plaintiff’s prima facie case, it should be reluctant to embrace a standard of
causation that describes neither the reality of how discrimination occurs nor
how people make decisions and act.

211. See id. at 383, 387, 396.
212. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 263–64 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (first citing
Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1, 3–4 (Cal. 1948); then citing Kingston v. Chi. & N.W.R. Co.,
211 N.W. 913, 915 (Wis. 1927); and then citing 2 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, SELECT CASES ON
THE LAW OF TORTS § 153, 865 (1912)).
213. See, e.g., Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 418 (2011). See generally Martha
Chamallas & Sandra F. Sperino, Torts and Civil Rights Law: Migration and Conflict:
Symposium Introduction, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 1021, 1021–22 (2014); Paul J. Gudel, Beyond
Causation: The Interpretation of Action and the Mixed-Motives Problem in Employment
Discrimination Law, 70 TEX. L. REV. 17, 88–92 (1991).
214. 490 U.S. at 250.
215. See Krieger, supra note 50, at 1279; see also Susan Sturm, Second Generation
Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 460 (2001)
(suggesting that discrimination is often the product of unconscious bias).
216. See Gudel, supra note 213, at 80–82 (arguing that not all discriminatory acts have
motives, so “disparate treatment cannot be identified by the presence of a certain motive”).
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B. Two Better Ways—Learning from Babb and the POWADA
1. A Better Way (the Babb Way): Mixing Minimal Causation and ButFor Causation
If a weakness of the POWADA is its adoption of a uniform motivatingfactor standard of causation across the employment discrimination statutes,
what is a better option? If Congress intended in the 1991 Act to adopt a
standard of minimal causation,217 as seems to be the case, then Babb offers
a good option—“the decision is not made in a way that is untainted by such
discrimination.”218 This formulation seems more concrete than others that
might capture minimal causation, such as “played a role” or “contributing
factor.”219 Furthermore, contrary to the Supreme Court’s declarations in
Gross and its progeny, the original “because of” language does not
obviously or necessarily mean but-for causation as understood in tort law.
The formulation that a decision must be untainted by discrimination seems
consistent with the statutory language “because of” and the remedial
purposes of the employment discrimination statutes. Because Congress
likes to build on Supreme Court doctrine, Babb offers an option that might
effectuate minimal causation better than “motivating factor” has.
Choosing the Babb standard, or any other interpretation of minimal
causation, raises a second question that Congress must address. Does it
wish to limit remedies if but-for causation is not proven? Doing so would
be consistent with both Babb and the Title VII mixed-motives framework
added by the Civil Rights Act of 1991. However, if Congress considers
limiting remedies for failure to prove but-for causation, it would do well to
consider that it may create a disincentive for plaintiffs to argue their cases
under the lower causation standard. One of the disincentives to plaintiffs to
argue that their Title VII claims come under the current “motivating factor”
is the prospect of taking home no monetary relief (back pay, front pay, or
compensatory or punitive damages) if defendants satisfy the burden of
persuasion on the same-decision defense.220 If Congress continues to
choose that but-for causation must be proven for full remedies, it still could
217. See Katz, The Fundamental Incoherence, supra note 75, at 503–06.
218. Babb v. Wilkie, 140 S. Ct. 1168, 1174 (2020).
219. Professor Gudel has argued that divining factors for actions is not a useful way of
thinking about human decision making. See Gudel, supra note 213, at 101 (“[T]his Article's
thesis is that there are no mixed motives cases. . . . [A]nd there are no factors to separate out.
There is only the question of whether a given act is discriminatory.”).
220. See, e.g., Sullivan, Making Too Much, supra note 13, at 383.
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make more complete relief available upon a plaintiff’s proof of minimal
causation. It could make back pay, front pay, and reinstatement or
instatement available and require proof of but-for causation for
compensatory and/or punitive damages. Or, Congress could make
compensatory damages also available on proof of minimal causation and
punitive damages available only upon proof of but-for causation. The latter
approach would require a decoupling of compensatory and punitive
damages in § 1981a, which currently caps the total of compensatory and
punitive damages based on the number of employees of the defendant. 221
Congress would also need to specify which party has the burden of
persuasion at the second stage of the analysis that incorporates but-for
causation.
Congress should not add a minimal causation standard to the statutes
without specifying the relationship between that standard and the original
“because of” language that the Court has interpreted to mean “but for”—a
mistake of the 1991 Act. Accordingly, Congress should amend the
POWADA to declare that “because of” does not mean but for. The current
bills include a provision stating that a plaintiff is not required to prove sole
causation, 222 which could be changed to “but for.”
Congress should take care not to replicate another mistake of the 1991
Act. That amendment added a causation standard to Title VII without
addressing its effect on the proof frameworks. As discussed, causation
standards and proof frameworks are linked. 223 Although the Court could
have interpreted the Act to resolve this issue in Desert Palace224 or a later
case, it failed to do so. Congress needs to expressly state what it intends
regarding proof frameworks. If it intends to preserve the McDonnell
Douglas pretext analysis, it also should state the basis for deciding whether
to use that analysis or the framework incorporating minimal causation. As I
have argued before, Congress should, notwithstanding nostalgia, dispose of
the pretext framework once and for all. 225 Just as with the current Title VII
221. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3).
222. Protecting Older Workers Against Discrimination Act, H.R. 1230, 116th Cong. §
2(a)(1) (2020); Protecting Older Workers Against Discrimination Act, S. 485, 116th Cong. §
2(b)(3)(B) (2019).
223. See supra Section II.A.
224. Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 539 U.S. 90 (2003); see supra Section II.B.
225. See generally William R. Corbett, Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc.: McDonnell
Douglas to the Rescue?, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 1683 (2015); William R. Corbett, Fixing
Employment Discrimination Law, 62 SMU L. REV. 81 (2009).
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mixed-motives framework, a new framework with minimal causation and a
stage two remedies limitation is a suitable vehicle for proving and
analyzing all disparate treatment claims. With a new framework using
minimal causation at the prima facie case stage and but-for causation at the
remedy-limiting second stage, there is no role left for a pretext framework
that is understood as also incorporating but-for causation.
2. The Best Way: Dispatching with Causation Standards Altogether and
Instead Using Sufficiency of the Evidence
A different, more radical, and best option is for Congress to take
standards of causation and proof frameworks out of analysis of individual
disparate treatment claims altogether. This approach would dispatch with
constructs in employment discrimination law that have created endless
problems without much benefit 226 and instead require courts and juries to
evaluate evidence of discrimination under the standards applied to all civil
litigation. The POWADA bill passed by the House in 2020 and the
companion bill in the Senate include the following provision: “a
complaining party . . . may rely on any type or form of admissible evidence
and need only produce evidence sufficient for a reasonable trier of fact to
find that an unlawful practice occurred under this Act.” 227 This simple
statement incorporates the sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard used on
motions for summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law to
determine whether a claim is permitted to proceed to the factfinder. Indeed,
this is the standard articulated by one district court in its post-Comcast
opinion, Kilgore v. FedEx Freight,228 before it perfunctorily launched into
the McDonnell Douglas analysis. The bill should be amended to say that
plaintiffs are required to satisfy only the typical burden of production in
civil actions—sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to find for the
plaintiff229—and the burden of persuasion (preponderance of the evidence)
226. Some may protest that the proof frameworks, by creating special tenets and analyses
for employment discrimination claims, have benefited civil rights advocacy and plaintiffs. A
long history of problems with these structures demonstrates otherwise. See, e.g., Deborah C.
Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment After Hicks, 93 MICH. L. REV. 2229, 2324
(1995) (“The claim that we have ‘special’ rules for intentional discrimination cases creates a
false ‘sense of closure’ — a false belief that the law has already taken extraordinary steps to
assist Title VII plaintiffs.”).
227. H.R. 1230 § 2(a)(1); S. 485 § 3(a)(1).
228. 458 F. Supp. 3d 973, 979 (N.D. Ill. 2020). See supra notes 161–65 and
accompanying text.
229. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 50.
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to prevail on their claims.230 To prevent courts from clinging to the
McDonnell Douglas pretext framework, Congress would have to expressly
abrogate it.
This approach is the best because it treats employment discrimination
cases as other types of cases in civil litigation. It dispenses with the need to
determine which standard of causation and which proof framework apply to
any given case. It also obviates any need to characterize evidence as direct
or circumstantial. The simple questions on motions for summary judgment
and judgment as a matter of law would be whether the plaintiff has
produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to find discrimination.
At the conclusion of the case, the fact finder would decide whether the
plaintiff had proven discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence.
This approach strips away all these artificial231 constructs that were thought,
when conceived, to be helpful to the fact finder in answering the ultimate
question of whether there was discrimination.232 Rather than helping, these
devices have obscured the actual question. 233
It is doubtful that Congress is willing to so drastically break from the
structures created by the Supreme Court,234 freeing employment
230. Cf. Malamud, supra note 226, at 2324 (arguing that the Supreme Court should
declare “that there are no preferential rules for individual discrimination cases—that the law
will evaluate these discrimination claims like any other civil claims”).
231. They are “artificial” because they are not the real issue in the case—whether there
was intentional discrimination.
232. For example, the Supreme Court has explained that the McDonnell Douglas pretext
analysis “progressively . . . sharpen[s] the inquiry into the elusive factual question of
intentional discrimination.” Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Aff. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 n.8
(1981). It is telling that attempts to replace these cumbersome devices with substitute
artificial devices have been ill-fated. For example, the Seventh Circuit had intended to free
courts from distinguishing between direct and circumstantial evidence by saying that
plaintiffs could prove discrimination by presenting a “convincing mosaic” of evidence. See,
e.g, Otiz v. Werner Enters. Inc., 834 F.3d 760, 764 (7th Cir. 2016). Because courts
misunderstood “convincing mosaic” to be a new test that must be satisfied, the Seventh
Circuit found it necessary later to explain that it was meant to be a helpful metaphor. Id. at
765 (collecting cases where courts had used “convincing mosaic” as a governing legal
standard). Ironically, the court in Ortiz hastened to declare that the decision did not affect
another artificial construct—the McDonnell Douglas pretext framework. Id. at 766.
233. Denny Chin & Jodi Golinsky, Employment Discrimination: Moving Beyond
McDonnell Douglas: A Simplified Method for Assessing Evidence in Discrimination Cases,
64 BROOK. L. REV. 659, 669 (1998) (stating that in the McDonnell Douglas analysis,
“[c]learly, then, the inquiry into elusive factual questions is not being “sharpened”).
234. As evidenced by the POWADA, Congress generally is inclined to tinker with the
concepts and structures crated by the Court but not to dispense with them. Consider another
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discrimination law of standards of causation and proof frameworks.
However, stripping away all such artificial constructs and focusing on the
actual issue, whether intentional discrimination occurred, would be the best
repair of a body of law filled with unnecessary asymmetry, uncertainty, and
complexity.
VI. Conclusion
Employment discrimination law has been beset too long by an
intolerable level of asymmetry and uncertainty. Much of it stems from the
Civil Rights Act of 1991 and the Court’s interpretations of that Act. The
proposed Protecting Older Workers Against Discrimination Act has been
intended to ameliorate somewhat the state of the law. But the changes it
would make, while improvements, are not adequate to address the
problems. The Comcast and Babb decisions of the Supreme Court’s most
recent term exacerbated the situation, but Babb offers some hope of a better
way forward. Congress should amend and enact the POWADA to end this
state of intolerable asymmetry and uncertainty.

example—Congress modifying the Price Waterhouse mixed-motives framework in the Civil
Rights Act of 1991. See supra notes 73–78 and accompanying text.
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